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Abstract 
The increase in World’s population and economical development politics of the countries 
after the II. World War sped up the consumption of natural sources and caused 
environmental pollution due to the mass production. “Sustainable development” politics 
which comes with the economical growth and aims the protection of ecological systems 
formed the basics of environmental politics after 1980s. Since the usage and management 
of natural resources became to discuss of  basin planning. Basin concept doesn’t exist in the 
current management and planning organization of Turkey. The abundance of the number of 
independent decision makers and law/regulations which include environmental arguments 
increases the pollution problem in basins. 
This study, the decision makers who decide on environmental issues and the conflict 
between them are analyzed. This analysis is based on the game theory; which aims to 
explain the conflicts among player, strategy, interactive decision process. Players are the 
central authorities and local authorities. Although they work in favor of the public there are 
some conflicts among them. There are conflicts that occur when the players have different 
and/or same strategies.  
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Introduction 
The increase in World’s population and economical development politics of the countries 
after the II. World War sped up the consumption of natural sources and caused 
environmental pollution due to the mass production (Meadows and others, 1972; Johnson, 
1974; Wolf, 1983). Environmental problems such as air, water and soil pollution; the loss 
of fertile agricultural areas and woodlands and the decrease in biological diversities due to 
the urban population increase and development of industry are experienced in all developed 
or less developed world countries. As the effect of environmental problems reached beyond 
the borders it is accepted that a worldwide avert program is mandatory (Bartone, C., and 
others, 1995; Serageldin and others, 1995; Brown and Mitchell, 1998).  
“Sustainable development” politics which comes with the economical growth and aims the 
protection of ecological systems formed the basics of environmental politics of especially 
developed countries after 1980s. In 1987 a report titled “Our Common Future“, prepared by 
the United Nations – The World Commission on Environment and Development, 
influenced all countries. Sustainable development politics were developed by UNCED 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and Agenda 21 (Brundtland and others, 1991; 
Leitman, 1994; Karaman, 1999). 
Sustainable development is still discussed with several aspects; how to provide justice 
among the generations and how to overcome the contradiction between developed 
countries/regions and less developed countries/regions is still a study subject (Kele￿ and 
HamamcI, 1997). Sustainability requires guaranteeing the permanence of reproduction 
process in two areas. One of them is the “reproduction of development”, and the other is 
“the self reproduction capacity” of natural resources (Greenhuisen and Nijkamp, 1994). 
Ecological approach to the planning which is considered as a significant instrument of 
economical growth is being discussed for a long time (Isard, 1972; Kozlowski and Hughes, 
1972; Rodgers, 1976). Rapid growth of urban areas and their development problems are the 
most effective factors in understanding the requirement of planning in a region. Since the 
use and management of natural resources became another criteria of planning concept, a 
discussion on the border of planning started.  3
River basin plans and river basin management whose borders are defined by natural 
resources have gained more importance than regional plans whose borders change whit the 
socio-economical and technological development in regard to the sustainability (Teclaff, 
1996; Aydemir ve Aydemir, 1998).  
Basin concept doesn’t exist in the current management and planning organization of 
Turkey. Besides, some specific basins in Turkey are defined by the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources - General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. But the Regional 
Directorates of State Hydraulic are not organized according to the borders of the basins. 
Some basins may be administered by more than one Regional Directorate.  Besides, there 
are several basins which are not within the borders of the province and/or district they 
belong (Ba￿aran, 1997).  
In Turkey a total number of 100 laws and 36 organizations are present concerning the 
environment issue which create confusion in practice (Da￿öz, 1995). Ministry of 
Environment, which was established in 1991, on the other hand, is not effective enough. 
The government of Turkey can be categorized into two major divisions. One is the central 
administation and its field units and the other is the series of local administration units. The 
Provincial Governor represents the State, the central administration, and all of its ministries 
within the province. There are the units of local administration, which consist of provincial 
local administrations, municipalities, and villages. All of these administration can be 
located in river basin thus the solution of environmental problems becomes more difficult 
since there is no organization for the management of basins. 
This study, a river basin in Turkey, the decision makers who decide on environmental 
issues and the conflict between them are analyzed. As for the study area, Nilüfer Stream 
Sub-basin within the borders of Susurluk Basin which is deeply affected and still being 
affected by the increasing environmental pollution is chosen. Besides having Bursa which 
is the third biggest industrial city within this area, the fact that General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works has a regular water pollution research for 20 years in this area was 
another significant factor in the choice of this sub-basin as the study area.   
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Method 
The decision makers who decide on the environmental issues and their strategies are 
explained according to game theory in river basin. Game theory is a mathematical theory 
which aims to explain the interactive decision making process in situation with more than 
one decision maker (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Myerson, 1991; Aumann and Hart, 1994). 
When there are many decision makers (players) the rivalry between them increase. Every 
player tries to maximize pay off him/her. We can see that there are non-cooperative 
situation in Turkey river basin. Behaviors of players, their strategies and their expected 
utility are explained by the game theory. Similarly, we can analyze decision makers and 
their behaviors in river basin, easily.     
The main elements of the game are players (two or more) and the strategies (pure strategy 
or mixed strategy) (Rasmusen, 1994). The uncertain in the game situations, players’ 
information, the number of their strategies and acts of the players are the elements that 
affect the game (Selten, 1995; Harsayni, 1967).  
Game theory which was first realized by a French Mathematician Emile Borel in 1921. In 
the following years it was improved especially during the World War II to explain the 
behavior of the agents and has been improved since then. After the world experienced an 
economical crisis in 1970s, the game theory rapidly gained importance in economy during 
the 1980s (Vajda, 1966; Rasmusen, 1994). In the game theory, there are distinction 
between non-cooperative and cooperative situations. Minimax theorem which was 
developed by Von Neumann for cooperative games aims to define best strategies for the 
agents (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Nash who was awarded by Nobel Prize for his 
contributions to the game theory, created significant approaches the non-cooperative games 
with n numbered players to how equilibrium could be achieved in the game theory (Nash, 
1996; Ritzberger, 2002).  
Game theory applications started in 1990s in several areas of social science. Analyzing the 
environmental problems with the game theory is a new area for the theory. The abundance 
of the environmental problems requires making a decision interactively. Therefore, the 
game theory can be applied for the solution of such problems at least theoretically. There 5
are studies in which air pollution problem is analyzed by the game theory with the 
cooperation of neighbor countries (Kuismin, 1998; Ray, 2000). Although they are limited 
the game theory applications in planning have started (Harshadeep and Nagaraja Rao, 
1995). The game theory which explains the uncertain situation that has many decision 
makers, will effect planning discipline in a positive way. This will also ease the analysis of 
many parameters that affect planning. In addition it will make it easier for the agents to 
cooperate if the conflict in the planned area are clearly defined.  It is possible to achieve 
cooperative that all agents are winner. Actually, this target is planning’s aim. If all agents 
are winner, sustainability is possible.  
Decision makers who decision the environmental issues are players in sub-basin. The 
strategies of each player and their conflicts have defined. When planning and environment 
are the subject of discussion it becomes more difficult to define the agents and their profits. 
In the previous application studies where the game theory was used it was observed that 
there was no problem of determining the players. For instance, in a war the enemies are 
defined and the main goal is victory with a minimum loss. Similarly, in a game among 
countries causing air pollution, the creators of the pollution are those countries, and there is 
no need for an analysis to determine this (Mensch, 1966; Ray, 2000). However, in this 
study it will be possible to see agents who we think have the same profits but turn out to 
make different decisions.  
The Condition of the Sub-Basin at Present 
Administrative Division 
Susurluk basin which is a very large (22399 km
2) is within the borders of three different 
provinces. There are 3 province governors (Bursa, BalIkesir, Kütahya), 15 district centers, 1 
metropolitan municipality, and 57 municipalities in the Susurluk basin. Susurluk basin lies 
within the administration of two different Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic which 
are 1
st Regional Directorate (administration area within the province borders of Bursa, 
Kocaeli and Yalova), 25
th Regional Directorate (administration area within the province 
borders of BalIkesir and Çanakkale). There are two wetland which are covered by 
RAMSAR agreement in 1984 and 1998 in the basin (D.S.%., 1984). 6
Susurluk basin is polluted by industrial, mining, agricultural and domestic wastewater. But 
the most polluted area is Nilüfer stream in which Turkey’s third biggest industrial 
metropolitan city Bursa lies. There are 1 Metropolitan Municipality (Bursa), 3 District 
Centers Municipality of Metropolitan Municipality (Nilüfer, Osmangazi, YIldIrIm), 4 
District Centers Municipalities (Gürsu, Karacabey, Kestel, Mudanya) and 13 Sub-District 
Municipalities in the Nilüfer Stream sub-basin. Nilüfer Stream sub-basin in Susurluk basin 
is seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Nilüfer Stream Sub-Basin In Susurluk Basin 
Socio-Economical Development in Sub-basin 
There has been an increase in population growth due to the industrial development in 1960s 
and since then. In 2000, the population of Bursa is 2 125 140 and the annual population 
growth rate is 28,6 %0 in 1990-2000 period. The annual population growth rate of 
metropolitan area, which contains 3 district centers, is 35,9 %0. (D.%.E, 2002. Bursa is one 
of the most important cities of Turkey since it has fertile agricultural lands also with its rich 
historical background.   7
There are 2 Organized Industry Districts and 5 industrial areas in the sub-basin. There are 8 
more industrial areas under construction. Bursa Organized Industry District in which 35000 
people work in 176 companies was constructed in 1961. There are 142 industrial 
investments and 26000 workers in Demirta￿ Organized Industry District  which was built in 
1990 in industrial area which started to develop in 1970s and has still been developing. 70 
% of the industry in the sub-basin is textile industry and 20 % of automotive and relevant 
industries. There are approximately 70 investments which depend on agricultural products 
(Bosb, 2003; Dosab, 2003).   
Another developing sector in Bursa is agriculture. The industrial labor force and service 
force are increasing in contrast to the agricultural labor force which is decreasing. (D.%.E., 
2002). Despite this fact increase in irrigation possibilities, technological innovation, 
marketing and agricultural industry has made the increase of agricultural products and the 
income gained from it possible (D.%.E, 2002).  
Usage of Natural Resource in Sub-basin 
Because of the industrial development and growth of population, fresh water consumption 
is increase in sub-basin. We can say that supplying fresh water and shearing its among 
domestic, agricultural and industrial usage are two main problems in sub-basin. 
Water demand in sub-basin is supplied by surface water (Nilüfer Stream) and ground water. 
There are dams, ponds and water channels still under construction from 1970s according to 
the public demand. 6 irrigation projects, 1 pond (Gölba￿I), 1 dam in order to supply 
drinking water in 1985 (DoRancI 1) and 2 dams for irrigation (HasanaRa, %znik) were built 
by D.S.%. in 1979.  Demirta￿ dam built because of irrigation and ground water of Demirta￿
uses industrial investments (D.S.%. 1984). Flood control of surface water and changing the 
direction of the stream are two of the projects that are planned to be applied by D.S.% in 
sub-basin. Dams and canal projects for irrigation are especially considered for the other 
branch of Susurluk basin (Emet, Orhaneli) (D.S.%. 2000). 
28 % of the ground water is provided for Bursa Metropolitan Municipality for drinking and 
domestic potable water, 31% is supplied for the industrial potable waters, 36%  is used for 8
irrigation, and 5% is provided for Demirta￿ Sub-District Municipality for drinking and 
industrial potable water (D.S.%. 2000). Another problem in sub-basin is usage agricultural 
lands. Bursa has fertile agricultural lands, but its having been damaged by industrial and 
urban areas.    
Figure 2 Land Use in the Sub-Basin 
Pollutant And Pollution Of Surface Ground Water In Sub-Basin   
There are sewer systems in all settlements in sub-basin, but Bursa metropolitan settlement 
is unique as having a Lagoon Treatment System for domestic wastewater. Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality is using the European Bank Credit to develop and rehabilitation 
two current treatment plant and sewer systems (Metropolitan Municipality, 2003) .  
Bursa Organized Industrial District in which 176 investments was constructed in 1961, but 
wastewater treatment system was built in 1998. There are 142 industrial investments in 
Demirta￿ Organized Industry District  which was built in 1990 in industrial area which 
started to develop in 1970s, but there is no wastewater treatment system (Bosb, 2003; 
Dosab, 2003). Most of the industries don’t have a treatment system. Because of increasing 9
product cost, existing ones are not working effectively. All industrial wastewater is 
discharged to surface water in sub-basin.  
The most important pollutant besides the settlements and industries in the sub-basin is 
agricultural pollution. Chemical pollution and pesticides aren’t measured in sub-basin solid, 
but General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works research indicated that irrigation water 
that rejoins to the water cycle system is already polluted.  
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works carried out water pollution measurement 
experiments in the sub-basin in 1979-1982 and 2000. Results are classified according to 
“Water Pollution Control Regulations, The Quality Criteria of Inland Water”. We can see 
in Table 1 that changing the quality of inland water in four different analysis points.  
Surface waters are classified in four groups according to the Water Pollution Control 
Regulations. High qualified 1st class waters; drinking water could be used for recreational, 
fishing and other purposes. 2nd class less polluted water can be used as drinking water after 
a treatment, as well as fishing, watering, and in all activities which doesn’t require 1st class 
water. 3rd class polluted water can be used as industrial waters (excluding textile and 
sustenance industries) after a suitable treatment method. 4th class polluted waters can not 
be used for any purpose (SKKY, Article 7, 1988). The quality of parameters which was 
analyses in surface water; A) Physical Parameters, Water warm (oC), Ph, Electrical 
Conductor (EC,µmhos/cm), TDS, SS, Cl, NH3-N, NO2-N, NO3-N, Dissolved Oxygen 
(DO), Na, B-) Organic Parameters; M-Al, P-Al, pV, BOD5, TH, o-PO4, COD, C-) 
Inorganic Parameters; Fe, Mn, K, Ca, Mg, B (D.%.E., 1984; D.S.%., 2000). 
As the analysis results of year 1979-1982 are investigated, it is possible to say that surface 
water used to flow quite clean from the spring to Bursa according to the parameters. The 
pollution in the surface water started mainly with the domestic wastewaters. After the 
domestic wastewater discharge in the surface waters, the water quality became 4th class 
according to the physical parameters, 1st and 2nd class according to the other parameters. 
Industrial and agricultural wastewater contributes the pollution as they join the flow. Water 
quality is 4th class according to the physical parameters. If the water is investigated for the 
organic and inorganic parameters it is possible to consider water at this point as 2nd class. 10
Finally Bursa Organized Industrial District wastewater is discharged in the stream. 
Biological life and all fish species are lost in this section of the stream.  
In the analysis of years 1998-1999, it seems that there is not a significant difference in the 
water quality of stream until DoRancI Dam which supply fresh water. After the domestic 
wastewater discharge to the stream water quality becomes 4th class according to the 
physical and organic parameters, and 2nd class according to the microbiological 
parameters. As the industrial wastewater is mixed with the flow water quality becomes 
even beyond the 4th class according to the physical, organic and microbiological 
parameters. At this point stream flow seems to be a sewerage channel and the water quality 
is destroyed gradually.  
The result of discussion is that Nilüfer Surface Water System has an increasing pollution 
rate excluding the DoRancI Dam. It is possible to say that biological balance is destroyed 
totally in the stream, as well as biological diversity. Nilüfer stream has become an open 
channel which carries the waste of Bursa through Simav Stream until Marmara Sea and 
finally become the area which suffers deeply from water pollution.  
Table 1 Changing The Quality Of Inland Water 1982 (1
st value) – 1999 (2
nd value)  
  T pH TDS Cl  NH3-N  NO2-N  NO3-N DO 
N1 1-1  2-3  1-1  1-1  2  2-4  1-1  1 
N2 1-1  2-1  1-2  1-2  4  4-4  1-1  1 
N3 1-1  1-4 2  2-2  4  4-4  1-1  2 
N4 1-1  1-1 2  2-3  4  4-4  1-1  2 
BOD5 o-PO4 SO4 Fe  Na  T-coli  CN  COD
N1 1-2 2  1  3-3  1  2  1  4 
N2 1-4 4  1 3  3  1  4  2-4 
N3 3-4 4  1 3  1  2  4  2-4 
N4 3-4 4  1 3  3  1  4  2-4 
Source: D.S.%., 1984; D.S.%., 2000  
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Figure 3 The Quality of Water in the Sub-Basin 1999  
The Definition of the Players and Their Strategies in the Sub-Basin 
Players who decide on environmental issues in the sub-basin. The habitants and investors 
of sub-basin who are directly affected by the pollution are not defined as players. Because 
their personal actions don’t effect environment. These kind of players are called “Pseudo 
Players” in game theory (Rasmusen, 1994). Pseudo players can be affected to strategies of 
players.   
There are 33 Players in the sub-basin. 9 ministries (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Forrest, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Reconstruction and 
Settlement, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, Ministry of Agriculture) and 1 General Directorate Of Rural Services under the 
Prime Ministry, 1 Metropolitan Municipality (Bursa), 3 District Center Municipalities of 
Metropolitan Municipality (Nilüfer, YIldIrIm, Osmangazi), 4 District Center Municipalities 
(Keles, Gürsu, Mudanya, Karacabey) and 13 Sub-District Municipalities. Players of the 
sub-basin and their relationships are seen in Figure 4.  12
Players are public institution which are all acting on behalf of the public benefits. They can 
not behavior, illegally, because they roles are defined by laws. There are each player’s 
strategies related with roles. Players are assumed to act rationally when they choose their 
strategies. Of course every player has many strategies but we choose that effect the 
environment. Some players have same strategies or they can choose a dominant strategy 
among the others strategies.  
Player’s strategies are defined from the publications in which ministries and local 
administration explain their plans, programs and goals. It is possible to have hidden goals 
as well as the obvious ones in the determination of strategies. For instance increasing 
municipality incomes is a necessity for better service, and increasing the income is a 
dominant strategy, and there is another strategy which is more dominant but not 
pronounced loudly, such as collecting more votes in the next election. Such hidden goals 
are considered in the determination of the strategy if they have the possibility to affect the 
important environmental decisions.  
Players conflicts occurs three different types. First, conflicts are between central 
administration (ministries) and local administration (municipalities). Secondly, conflicts are 
among central administration units, and thirdly conflicts are among local administrations.  
We can see that players, roles, strategies and among players conflicts in Table 2.     13
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Figure 4  Players of the sub-basin and their relationships 1415
CONCLUSION 
The abundance of the number of independent decision makers and law/regulations which 
include environmental arguments increases the pollution problem in basins. Turkish central 
authorities system is organized according to the province. There is no basin managemant 
and planning, as a result pollution and consumption of the natural resources in the basins 
increases. 
The organization of the decision makers and cooperation among decision makers will 
provide the sustainability of the basin. This analysis is based on the game theory; which 
aims to explain the conflicts among player, strategy, interactive decision process. The game 
theory is useful to explain decision maker’s behaviors in the sub-basin, because there are 
many authorities who make the decision on environmental issues and their strategies are 
defined in this study. 
Players are the central authorities and local authorities. Although they work in favor of the 
public there are some conflicts among them. These conflicts may take place between the 
central authorities and local authorities or among the different units of central authorities 
and local authorities. Sometimes it is possible to experience these three sorts of conflicts at 
the same time. There are other conflicts that occur when the players have different 
strategies. Such as the contradiction between the municipalities that are willing to increase 
industrial activities and the Environmental Ministry that supports industrial areas in order 
to control environmental pollution. Besides, there are some other conflicts in which players 
have contradiction because of their same strategies. Such as; Ministry of Environmental, 
Metropolitan Municipality and Ministry of Agricultural that have the strategy for 
preventing environmental pollution using different regulations of the water pollution 
standards. 
Metropolitan Municipality, other municipalities and Environmental Ministry experience 
such conflicts the most. Municipalities prefer to act independent from the central 
authorities. Most of the conflicts occur between the ministries and Metropolitan Authorities 
which has the most environmental problems.  16
There is a progress in industrial development as well as the increase in agriculture and the 
population in the sub-basin. The results of the water analysis of 1979-1982 showed that the 
stream was polluted because of these activities. According to the analysis of 2000 the 
pollution is still increasing.  
The result of the economical effects of existing water pollution in sub-basin is very 
interesting. The first problem is supplying clean water and how to provide it to all sectors. 
This problem is solved in a short time and particular way. There is a point that all players 
agree; protection of the dam that provides potable water for Bursa city. Ground water is 
reserved for industrial use, and ponds are formed for the agricultural usage. The treatment 
expense of industrial and domestic wastewater is saved.  
Other resources are development in order to agricultural lands. When economical change in 
Bursa is investigated it seems that industrial and agricultural incomes are increasing. Which 
means agricultural income is not affected by not using polluted water in this area. Thus 
environmental costs didn’t increase the expenses of industrial and urban investments. The 
most important result of the water pollution is the reduction in biological diversity and the 
lost of esthetic view. Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has projects for the treatment of 
stream and takes regular steps for the application of them lately. Although all the strategies 
that prevent the environmental pollution, economical development is more valued and 
preferred in the sub-basin. Environmental problems are postponed by players.  
This study in which players and their strategies are defined, and later it would be studied 
the possibility of decreasing environmental pollution using the game theory. Players should 
realize that they can win but environment will lose. It shows that the game is non-zero sum 
game. It is possible to classify the players as player groups according to their roles and 
strategies. Dominant and similar strategies must be defined among all strategies. The 
answer of “which strategy is optimum strategy for the player groups in agreement?” 
question must be investigated. The difficulty in this new study will be forming the pay off 
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Table 2 Players, Roles, Strategies and Among Players Conflicts in the Sub-Basin






(1) Development of life quality




With Environmental Ministry and Agricultural Ministry about the “discharge
permission”
Concerning the protection of water resources and surface water basins,
Environmental Ministry who has the authority to prepare specific plan,
Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement, Ministry of Tourism and





Land use planning (Law no,
3030)
(1) Development of life quality




The conflicts are increasing when Metropolitan Municipality and their district
center municipality belong to different political parties. They generally have




Urban services and land use
planning (Law no, 1580)
(1) Development of life quality




Between municipalities that are willing to develop their industrial activities
and special offices that prepare plans for special purposes. (such as
Environment, Housing, Industry),
With the Ministry of Health concerning 2nd class "working licenses"
permission for industrial plants,
Municipalities have conflict concerning the responsibility of the pollution
treatment cost.
Sub-District Municipalities Urban services and land use
planning (Law no, 1580 and
Law no, 3030)
(1) Development of life quality




There are authorization problems between sub-district municipalities and
Metropolitan Municipality especially when sub-district municipalities are
within the metropolitan borders. Sub-district Municipalities act independently
since they consider themselves according to the 1580 numbered municipal
regulations. They don’t follow the high scale planning decisions of
metropolitan municipality.




Economic development in rural
area
With the municipalities and the Ministry of Agriculture concerning the usage
of agricultural lands,21
Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources and 1
st
Regional Directorate of State
Hydraulic




(1) Supply to Bursa fresh water
(2) Developing dams and pond










(1) Protection of environment and
natural resource




With municipalities that avoid environmental infrastructure expenses,
With the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement Ministry concerning
environmental plan,
With municipalities concerning the operation permissions for new
investments with the investigation of environmental effects,
With the Ministry of Agriculture concerning the soil pollution,
With Metropolitan Municipality and the Ministry of Agriculture concerning
discharge standards,
With Industrial Ministry who doesn’t oblige industries for developing






standards and planning in
outlying municipalities areas
(Law no, 3194)
(1) Defining and development
construction,
(2) Monitoring
(3) Developing of settlements
With the Ministry of Environment concerning environmental plan,






(1) Increasing of agricultural
income
(2) Developing harvest health
standards
With General Directorate Of Rural Services concerning the authorization to
give the permission for the usage of agricultural lands out of agricultural
purposes,
With the municipalities those give housing permission for the agricultural
lands,
With Metropolitan Municipality and Ministry of Environmental concerning
Discharge Criteria.





(1) Increasing industrial income
(2) Developing product standards
and encourage exportation
Ministry of Industry which supports and builds the Organized Industrial
Districts, is pushed by the municipalities concerning the choosing location for
the Organized Industrial Districts.22